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I. JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appeal is brought pursuant to Article VIII, Sections 3 
and 5 of the Constitution of Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-
2(3)(j) and 78-2a-3(k), and Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the 
Complaint was a nullity where plaintiff lacked capacity to sue 
under Utah's wrongful death and survivorship statutes. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly denied the Rule 17(a) 
Motion to substitute in plaintiff's place persons who had the 
capacity to sue under Utah's wrongful death and survivorship 
statutes. 
3. Whether the limitation period under Utah's wrongful 
death statute is constitutional. 
Concerning questions of law, the appeals court accords no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions, and the standard of 
review is "correctness." City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 
P.2d 513, 516 (Utah 1990). 
Concerning factual issues, if any, on summary judgment, the 
record is viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 414 (Utah 
1986). 
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III. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Constitutional Provisions: 
Utah Const., Art. XVI, Sec. 5: 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries 
resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and the 
amount recoverable shall not be subject to any 
statutory limitation, except in cases where 
compensation for injuries resulting in death is 
provided for by law. 
Statutory Provisions: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-7: 
Except as provided in Title 35, Chapter 1, when the 
death of a person not a minor is caused by the wrongful 
act or neglect of another, his heirs, or his personal 
representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may 
maintain an action for damages against the person 
causing the death . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1)(a): 
Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the 
person or death caused by the wrongful act or 
negligence of another do not abate upon the death of 
the wrongdoer or the injured person. The injured 
person or the personal representatives of heirs of the 
person who died have a cause of action against the 
wrongdoer or the personal representatives of the 
wrongdoer for special and general damages . . . . 
Rules: 
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R. Civ. P.: 
The following defenses may at the option of the pleader 
be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted. 
Rule 15(c), Utah R. Civ. P.: 
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended 
pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in 
the original pleading, the amendment relates back to 
the date of the original pleadings. 
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Rule 17(a), Utah R. Civ. P.: 
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest. An executor, administrator, 
guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party 
with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for 
the benefit of another, or a party authorized by 
statute may sue in that person's name without joining 
the party for whose benefit the action is brought; 
. . . No action shall be dismissed on the ground that 
it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after 
objection for ratification of commencement of the 
action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real 
party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or 
substitution shall have the same effect as if the 
action had been commenced in the name of the real party 
in interest. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case, Course Of Proceedings And 
Disposition Below. 
Mr. Haro's Estate sued defendants (who are beneficiaries of 
the estate) for personal injury and wrongful death. Defendants 
moved to dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, on the grounds that Utah law does not permit 
one's estate to bring an action for personal injury or wrongful 
death. The trial court granted the motion, ruling that the 
Complaint was a nullity. The trial court denied plaintiff's Rule 
17(a) motion to substitute parties, which was filed after the 
statute of limitations had run on the underlying claims. 
B. Statement Of Facts. 
1. On February 24, 1991, Martin Haro died as a result 
of carbon monoxide poisoning he had sustained on December 17, 
1990, while he was living at Mrs. Haro's Layton, Utah home. (R. 
at 1-2.) 
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2. On January 12, 1993, Mr. Haro's Estate sued 
decedent's wife, Maria Guadalupe Haro, and his son, Everardo 
Haro, claiming that their fault caused his injuries and eventual 
death. The Estate sought special damages in excess of $80,000 
(medical bills and funeral expenses). (R. at 1-2.) 
3. The Estate also sought special and general damages 
against Mr. Haro's wife and son for Mr. Haro's death. (R. at 1-
2.) 
4. The trial court dismissed the Complaint for 
failure to state a claim and denied the Estate's Motion to 
Substitute under Rule 17(a), which was filed on or about April 
28, 1993, after the two-year statute of limitations had run. (R. 
at 52, 53, 86, 163-65, 167-69, 172-75.) 
5. The trial court denied the Estate's Motion to 
reconsider, with minor exceptions not before this Court. (R. at 
163-65, 167-69, 172-75.) 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Where the Estate had no legal capacity to sue on its own 
behalf or on behalf of others, it failed to state a claim and the 
Complaint was a nullity. The trial court properly denied 
plaintiff's Rule 17(a) motion where the Estate had no legal 
capacity to sue on behalf of the "real party in interest," and 
where there was nothing to which such amendment would have 
related back under Rule 15(c). The legislature's imposition of a 
reasonable time period in which to exercise the right to bring 
wrongful death action is not inconsistent with the fundamental 
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nature of the right; the two-year statute of limitations is 
constitutional. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMPLAINT WAS A NULLITY. 
Mr. Haro's Estate lacked capacity to sue in its own behalf 
or in behalf of another under Utah's wrongful death and 
survivorship statutes. Since the Estate lacked statutory 
capacity to sue, it failed to state a claim for relief. 
Therefore, the complaint was a nullity. 
Wrongful death and survivorship claims in Utah are statutory 
creations. The statutes provide for a limited list of 
individuals who are allowed to bring claims against alleged 
wrongdoers. Utah!s wrongful death statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-11-7, provides that the heirs, or the personal 
representatives of the deceased on behalf of the heirs, may bring 
a wrongful death claim. Utah's survivorship statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-11-12, similarly, provides that the heirs, or the 
personal representatives of the heirs, may bring a survivorship 
action against the alleged wrongdoer. Neither statute provides 
that the estate can bring an action against the alleged 
wrongdoer. 
The deceased's Estate is a separate entity from the heirs 
and personal representatives. Thus, the estate is not authorized 
to bring a wrongful death or survivorship action and is not a 
party under either the wrongful death or the survivorship 
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statute. See Behm!s Estate v. Gee, 117 Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657, 
660 (1950).x 
Claims exist in the persons statutorily specified. The 
claims do not exist in the Estate of the decedent, in behalf of 
itself or of another. The Complaint was therefore a nullity.2 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO 
SUBSTITUTE: RULE 17(a) REQUIRES THAT THE PARTY WHO SUES 
HAVE LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE IN ITS OWN BEHALF OR IN 
BEHALF OF THE "REAL PARTY IN INTEREST"; WHERE THE 
COMPLAINT WAS A NULLITY, THERE WAS NOTHING TO WHICH AN 
AMENDMENT WOULD HAVE RELATED BACK UNDER RULE 15(c). 
Plaintiff moved the trial court to allow it to substitute 
the "real parties in interest" for the party bringing suit, 
misconstruing Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 17(a) is inapposite. 
aThe Court explained: 
[S]uit can be instituted either by the heirs themselves 
or by the personal representative of the deceased for 
the benefit of the heirs. The wording of the section 
compels a conclusion that the legislature intended that 
the proceeds obtained from the wrongdoer would not be 
intermingled with other assets of the estate of the 
deceased . . . . 
For many years this court has confirmed the principle 
that the statutory beneficiaries take separate and 
apart from the estate. 
213 P.2d at 660. 
2Plaintiff asks what difference it makes if the Estate 
rather than the party in whom a statutory claim exists brings 
suit. If that were the attitude of the courts, what difference 
would any statute or rule make? 
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A. CONSTRUCTION OF RULE 17(a). 
Rule 17(a) is not a "relation back" rule. Instead, Rule 
15(c) governs the "relation back" doctrine. The purpose of Rule 
17(a) is to grant defendant the right to have a claim prosecuted 
by the real party in interest, preventing duplicate demands 
against the defendant and permitting the defendant to assert all 
defenses and counterclaims available against the real owner of 
the claim. Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 745 (1952). 
Rule 17(a) assumes that the person who sues, but who is not 
the "real party in interest," at least, has the capacity to sue 
in behalf of the "real party in interest."3 When it is shown 
that the person who brought suit is a stranger to the claim, Rule 
17(a) does not assume that he may substitute the "real party in 
interest" and trigger Rule 15(c)fs "relation back" provisions. 
Under the statutory claims, Mr. Haro's Estate had no more 
capacity to sue in behalf of the "real parties in interest" for 
Mr. Haro's wrongful death or survivorship than did an unrelated 
acquaintance of or a stranger to Mr. Haro. The Estate's lawsuit 
against defendants did not put defendants on notice of a claim 
for wrongful death or survivorship by the heirs or personal 
representative of decedent on behalf of the heirs.* Therefore, 
3Indeed, Rule 17 accommodates the wrongful death and 
survivorship statutes by allowing the personal representatives to 
maintain the action without naming the individual heirs, even 
though the heirs are the "real parties in interest." 
*This is particularly the case where the defendants both are 
beneficiaries of the Estate of Mr. Haro, and had the potential to 
benefit from their own misconduct, were the money to pass through 
(continued...) 
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the trial court properly denied the Rule 17(a) motion to 
substitute, and determined that the Complaint was a nullity 
subject to dismissal. 
B. APPLICATION OF RELATION BACK RULE, 15(c). 
Rule 15(c) allows certain amendments in pleadings to relate 
back to the date of original filing. Rule 15(c) does not, 
however, allow amendments substituting parties or adding new 
parties. Amendments substituting parties or adding new parties 
amount to the assertion of a new claim and otherwise defeat the 
purpose of statutes of limitation. E.g., Doxey-Layton Co. v. 
Clark, 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976); Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761 
P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1984).5 
In the present case, had the trial court allowed the 
substitution of parties, that amendment still would not have 
related back to the original filing and saved the case from 
dismissal. 
4 ( . ..continued) 
the estate, which is precisely the result the legislature has 
avoided under the clear statutory language. 
5The only exception to this rule is where the new and old 
parties have an identify of interests. Doxey-Layton Co. v. 
Clark, 548 P.2d 902 (Utah 1976); Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co., 761 
P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1984). 
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POINT III 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Plaintiff contends that the statute of limitation in 
wrongful death actions violates the Constitution of Utah. The 
provision on which the Estate relies is Article XVI, Section 5, 
which states: 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries 
resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and the 
amount recoverable shall not be subject to any 
statutory limitation, except in cases where 
compensation for injuries resulting in death is 
provided for by law. 
The first prong concerns the right to bring a wrongful death 
claim. The second prong concerns the limitation of the amount of 
damages recoverable in wrongful death actions. The two parts 
should be analyzed separately. 
A. STATUTES OF LIMITATION DO NOT ABROGATE THE RIGHT TO 
RECOVER DAMAGES FOR INJURIES RESULTING IN DEATH. 
Plaintiff argues that any statutory limitation in wrongful 
death cases is unconstitutional. Plaintiff relies on Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) and Malan v. Lewis, 693 
P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) for this proposition. This argument is 
untenable and is not supported by either case.6 Indeed, Berry 
and Malan support the conclusion that the legislature may enact 
reasonable procedures for the enforcement of wrongful death 
actions and may provide for reasonable defenses that are not 
inconsistent with the fundamental nature of the wrongful death 
eIf plaintiff's argument were accepted, there could never be 
repose in wrongful death cases. 
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action itself, such as the imposition of reasonable limitation 
periods in which to exercise the right. 
Berry involved a wrongful death claim against an aircraft 
manufacturer brought under products liability theories. The 
death claim was instituted within the two-year period for 
wrongful death claims. However, the statute of repose for death 
or injury caused by a defective product was six years after sale 
of the product or ten years after manufacture of the product. 
The Court concluded that the statute of repose for defective 
products was unconstitutional because it operated to bar actions 
without regard to when the injury occurred. In other words, the 
statutory period in which to file suit for death or injury 
arising out of the use of a product could run before the injury 
or death occurred. In that circumstance, the statute of repose 
extinguished the right to bring an action before a claim arose, 
operated as an absolute bar, provided the injured person no 
reasonable time in which to sue, and therefore violated the open 
courts and wrongful death provisions of the Constitution of Utah. 
Berry, 717 P.2d 670, 671-85.7 
The Berry Court recognized that despite the existence of the 
open courts and wrongful death provisions, the Legislature may 
TIn Malan, the Utah Supreme Court found Utah's Guest Statute 
unconstitutional because it altogether deprived a class of 
persons the right to bring suit for injuries or death. The 
holding was grounded primarily in equal protection theory. 
Unlike the statute before this Court which gave a statutory 
plaintiff two years in which to sue, the guest statute provided 
Mr. Malan no opportunity to bring a claim for injuries. 693 P.2d 
at 663-69. 
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enact reasonable procedures for enforcement of wrongful 
death actions and may provide for reasonable defenses 
that are not inconsistent with the fundamental nature 
of the wrongful death action. 
Id. at 685. 
Unlike the statute of repose struck down in Berry, the 
statute of limitations for wrongful death does not run without 
regard to the date on which the injury occurs. The statute of 
limitations begins to run only after the injury occurs. As 
opposed to a statute of repose, as in Berry, the wrongful death 
statute of limitations offers a balance of interests: it allows a 
reasonable time in which to exercise the constitutional right, 
yet protects a potential defendant from exposure for an unlimited 
time as memories fade and evidence disappears; enacting the 
wrongful death statute of limitation therefore falls within the 
legislature's prerogative and is not inconsistent with the 
fundamental nature of the wrongful death action itself. 
Statutes which set reasonable time limitations in which to 
exercise the right do not offend the rights at issue, are within 
the legislature's prerogative, balance the defendant's rights and 
interests, and are constitutional. E.g., Horn v. Shaffer, 47 
Utah 55, 151 P. 555 (1915); McHenry v. Utah Valley Hosp., 724 F. 
Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1989). 
B. STATUTES OF LIMITATION DO NOT LIMIT AMOUNTS RECOVERABLE 
FOR INJURIES RESULTING IN DEATH. 
The limitation period at issue does not purport to place a 
limit on amounts recoverable for injuries resulting in death. 
Assuming a plaintiff files the claim within the reasonable time 
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set by the legislature (two years), the damages are not subject 
to statutory limitation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the Amended Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of Dismissal of the trial court, 
DATED this 10 day of February, 1994. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By i'j /-J v \*fa<MU$~v. 
>rt H. Hei 
By 
Richard^ TTT^ a^r^ Waljonei 
Attorneys for Defendant/) 
Appellee Maria Guadalupe Haro 
35\rav\05968.885\bH ef 
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RAYMOND M. BERRY (A0310) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Maria Guadalupe Haro 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE ESTATE OF MARTIN HARO, 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACTS, 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT 
vs. 
MARIA GUADALUPE HARO and Civil No. 930700016PI 
EVERARDO HARO, 
Honorable w. Brent West 
Defendants. 
This action came on for hearing on Defendant's Motion 
to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Real Party in 
Interest on Thursday, the 3rd day of June, 1993, Honorable w. 
Brent West presiding, no one appearing for the plaintiff, Raymond 
M. Berry appearing for Defendant Maria Guadalupe Haro and J. Kent 
Holland appearing for Defendant Everardo Haro. The Court having 
read the memoranda of counsel, having heard the arguments of 
Raymond M. Berry and J. Kent Holland and also having considered 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration as to Rule 59(1) and 
60(b)(1) Motions as timely made, now therefore makes the 
following amended findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On February 24, 1991, Martin Haro died from carbon 
monoxide intoxication as the result of inhaling carbon monoxide 
fumes on December 17, 1990, in the home of his wife, Maria 
Guadalupe Haro. 
2. That on January 12, 1993, an action was instituted 
in the name of the Estate of Martin Haro, Plaintiff, vs. Maria 
Guadalupe Haro and Juan A. Haro. 
3. That on February 26, 1993, an Amended Complaint 
was filed which listed only Maria Guadalupe Haro and Everardo 
Haro as defendants. 
4. That the Complaint and Amended Complaint are 
nullities since the Estate of Martin Haro does not have capacity 
to sue. 
5. That the Amended Complaint naming Everardo Haro as 
a defendant was filed more than two years after the date of the 
death of Martin Haro. 
6. That Estella Haro, Maria A. Treto, Leonor Arteago, 
Alberto Haro, Juan A. Haro, Francisca Arellano, Esteban Haro, 
Raudel Haro, Emilia Haro and Sylvia Haro are children and heirs 
of Maria Guadalupe Haro and Martin Haro. 
7. Martin Haro died intestate. 
2 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. As the Estate of Martin Haro is not an heir and 
did not have the capacity to sue, the Complaint and Amended 
Complaint are nullities. 
2. It is not necessary to make a determination of 
heirship under the Probate Code in order to maintain a wrongful 
death action. 
3. Oral argument was not necessary. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
Now therefore, it is ordered and adjudged: 
1. That the above-entitled action by the Estate of 
Martin Haro v. Maria Guadalupe Haro and Everardo Haro be 
dismissed with prejudice on the merits. 
2. That Plaintiff's Motion to substitute the 
children, Estella Haro, Maria A. Treto, Leonor Arteago, Alberto 
Haro, Juan A. Haro, Francisca Arellano, Esteban Haro, Raudel 
Haro, Emilia Haro and Sylvia Haro is denied with prejudice. 
3. That the action of the Estate of Martin Haro v. 
Maria Guadalupe Haro and Everardo Haro is dismissed with 
prejudice as to Defendant Everardo Haro as the action was not 
instituted within two years of the date of the death of the 
deceased, Martin Haro. 
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DATED this day of August, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable w. Brent West 
District Court Judge 
4 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Linda St. John, being duly sworn, says that she is 
employed by the law offices of snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for Defendant Maria Guadalupe Haro herein; that she 
served the attached AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT (Case Number 930700016PI, Second Judicial District 
Court of Davis County, State of Utah) upon the parties listed 
below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
Donald C. Hughes 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
795 - 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Scott W. Holt 
44 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
J. Kent Holland 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
Attorney for Everardo Haro 
623 East 100 South 
P.O. BOX 11643 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0643 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the y ' day of August, 1993, 
SUBSCRIBED 
August, 1993. 
Mv Commission Expires: 
.M_0T/t BY PUBLIC 
day of 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the state of Utah 
iStt 
IfrOmittKionExpirts 
JTAlBOFtfTAW 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on the M day of February, 1994 
I caused two (2) true and correct copies of the Brief of 
Defendant Maria Guadalupe Haro to be served upon the following: 
Donald C. Hughes 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
795 - 24th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Scott w. Holt 
44 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
J. Kent Holland 
ANDERSON & HOLLAND 
Attorney for Everardo Haro 
623 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 11643 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0643 
Richard 
